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Abstract
A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present 
paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic 
question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic 
relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the 
theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter-
native geometrical representations.
In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential 
import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation of assertoric sentences 
in Aristotle’s traditional logic. Following Abelard’s distinction between two 
alternative readings of the O-vertex: Non omnis and Quidam non, a logical 
difference is made between negation and denial by means of a more fine-
grained modal analysis. 
A consistent treatment of assertoric oppositions is thus made possible 
by an underlying abstract theory of logical opposition, where the central 
concept is negation. A parallel is finally drawn between opposition and 
consequence, laying the ground for future works on an abstract operator 
of opposition that would characterize logical negation just as does Tarski’s 
operator of consequence for logical truth.
Key words: affirmation, denial, existential import, negation, NOT, oppo-
sition, QAS
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1. An Abstract Theory of Opposition
1.1. A Question-Answer Game for Oppositions
To define logical oppositions, we developed a question-answer game in 
which the logical value of a formula is not a truth-value but an answer to 
the corresponding question. We refer to this conceptual framework here-
after as Question-Answer Semantics (QAS).
1.1.1 What is a Logical Opposition?
While the concept of opposition occurs in various places and senses within 
Aristotle’s works1, the theory of logical opposition is the resulting group of 
four logical relations: contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety, and sub-
alternation. Let us symbolize by Op(α, β) the 2-place relation between the 
two relata α and β, where Op is to be read as “ – is opposed to …”. If these 
are strictly concerned with the combination of truth and falsity, then only 
propositions can serve as values of α and β. Let us symbolize by T and F 
the logical values of truth and falsity, and let v be the interpretation func-
tion that assigns a logical value to propositions. Then v(α) = T / F means 
that the proposition α is true/false.
Recalling that the Aristotelian oppositions obey the Principle of Biva-
lence (PBV), namely: every proposition is either true or false but not both, 
every opposition Op(α, β) could be seen as a 2-ary relation belonging to the 
set of ordered couples {〈T, T〉,〈T, F〉,〈F, T〉,〈F, F〉}. In other words, oppositions 
could be rendered by the perfect disjunctive normal forms (DNF) character-
izing the relation R(α, β): (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ ∼β) ∨ (∼α ∧ β) ∨ (∼α ∧ ∼β), where 
every affirmative proposition (α or β) is read as T and every negative prop-
osition (∼α or ∼β) is read as F.
1 See Aristotle (b), Δ10; and Aristotle (a), Chapter 10 for a general examination of the 
oppositions: by contrariety, by relation, by privation (and possession) and by affirmation 
(and negation).
 While the “metaphysical” sense of opposition is stated as a set of relations between 
concepts, the logical sense only concerns relations between propositions and the 
subcase of opposition by affirmation and negation. As for the metaphysical oppositions 
of contrariety and contradiction, they are included into logical oppositions by 
reformulating their conceptual relata into propositions.
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Definition 1. An opposition is a set of combined truth-values involving 
both truth and falsehood. Each opposition Op(α, β) is characterized by its 
specific DNF.
Definition 1.1. α and β are said to be contradictory to each other (Op: CD) 
if and only if (hereafter: iff) they cannot be T or F together.
CD(α, β) = {〈T, F〉,〈F, T〉}
DNF: (α ∧ ∼β) ∨ (∼α ∧ β)
Definition 1.2. α and β are said to be contrary to each other (Op: CT) iff 
they cannot be T together but can be F together.
CT(α, β) = {〈T, F〉,〈F, T〉,〈F, F〉}
DNF: (α ∧ ∼β) ∨ (∼α ∧ β) ∨ (∼α ∧ ∼β)
Subcontraries are also presented as “contradictories of contraries”, that is: 
each component of the DNF for subcontraries is the negation of a corre-
sponding component for contraries.
Definition 1.3. α and β are said to be subcontrary to each other (Op: SCT) 
iff they cannot be F together but can be T together.
SCT(α, β) = {〈T, T〉,〈T, F〉,〈F, T〉}
DNF: (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ ∼β) ∨ (∼α ∧ β)
The last opposition of subalternation is more difficult to define for two main 
reasons: it is not a symmetric relation; the proper DNF of subalternation 
cannot be so easily obtained from one of the three preceding oppositions.
Definition 1.4. α is said to be subalternate to β (Op: SB) iff β cannot be 
F whenever α is T.
SB(α, β) = {〈T, T〉,〈F, T〉,〈F, F〉}
DNF: (α ∧ β) ∨ (∼α ∧ β) ∨ (∼α ∧ ∼β)
Such definitions may strike as rather artificial, or at least incomplete: why 
not exhaust the set of possible DNFs? And why isn’t SB a symmetric rela-
tion like the other oppositions? It can be observed that a complete list of 
possible DNFs does not consist in a set of 4 oppositions but, rather, in a set 
of 16 logical connectives for classical logic. A reformulation of oppositions 
in terms of a question-answer game enhances their understanding.
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Definition 2. An opposition is a set of answers to questions about the com-
possible truth-values of α and β.
To the Q = 2 following questions Q1: “Possibly v(α) = v(β) = F?” and Q2: 
“Possibly v(α) = v(β) = T?”, oppositions reply with an ordered set of two 
yes-no answers. Let P be symbolized by 1 for affirmative answers: “yes”, 
and by 0 for negative answers: “no”. Only one answer is to be given to 
each question, so that oppositions result in an ordered 2-tuple of answers: 
Op(α, β) = 〈P1,P2〉.
The Aristotelian theory of quantified oppositions (see Aristotle (a), Ch.7) 
occasioned the famous Apuleian square AEIO, with a set of four sentential 
schemata {α, β,γ, δ} and a set of four oppositions Op = {SB, CT, SCT, CD}. 
The two horizontal lines stand for CT (the line AE) and SCT (the line IO); 
the two diagonals correspond to CD (the lines AO and EI); as for the two 
vertical lines, the arrows indicate the asymmetric relation of SB from α to 
β (the lines AI and EO)2.
Figure 1: Oppositions between Quantified Propositions
A
Universal affirmative
B : “Every S is P”
 1,0¯ E
 1,1¯
 0,1¯
Particular affirmative
H : “Not every S is not P”
! “Some S is P”
I
Particular negative
E : “Not every S is P”
! “Some S is not P”
O
Universal affirmative
C : “No S is P”
 “Every S is not P”
 1,1¯  0,0¯
Definition 2.1. SB yields an affirmative P1 and an affirmative P2.
(α, γ) = (β, δ) = 〈1, 1〉
2 The vertices A, E,I, O are to be traced back to medieval times, with AI (AffIrmo) for 
affirmative propositions and EO (nEgO) for negative propositions. It means that the 
capital letters have to do with the quality of the opposed formula, and not the quantity; 
consequently, they can and will be used hereafter for any applied oppositions beyond 
the single case of quantified oppositions.
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Definition 2.2. CT yields an affirmative P1 and a negative P2.
(α, β) = 〈1, 0〉
Definition 2.3. SCT yields a negative P1 and an affirmative P2.
(γ, δ) = 〈0, 1〉
Definition 2.4. CD yields a negative P1 and a negative P2.
(α, δ) = (β, γ) = 〈0, 0〉
1.1.2 How Many Oppositions are There?
The reason why there are 4 oppositions in Aristotle’s theory seems to be due 
to the cardinality of Q and P. Aristotle’s theory includes only 2 truth-values 
T and F (by PBV). No further truth-value can be introduced to increase the 
number n of questions, and no question can be answered both affirmatively 
and negatively; hence there are m = 2 sorts of available answers to each 
question, so that the number of the Aristotelian oppositions is mn = 22 = 4 
in the light of QAS.
Now some objections could be raised against the meaning and the number 
of “genuine” oppositions. Against this algebraic characterization of QAS, 
Béziau (2003) argues that opposition is synonymous with “incompatibility”: 
a propositional relation is an opposition only if its relata cannot be both true, 
in which case the appropriate question for characterizing Op is not Q2 but 
only Q1. And given that the answer to Q1 must be affirmative accordingly, 
opposition is not defined any longer as a combinatorial game of questions-
answers and should exclude both SCT and SB. Béziau however accepts SCT 
as a “verbal” opposition because of its derivation from CD and CT3; but he 
clearly excludes SB from his geometrical representations of opposition4.
3 “Let us recall that Aristotle does not introduce explicitly the notion of “subcontraries”, 
but refers to them only indirectly as “contradictories of contraries”; moreover he does 
not really consider them as opposed: ‘Verbally four kinds of opposition are possible, viz. 
universal affirmative to universal negative, universal affirmative to particular negative, 
particular affirmative to universal negative and particular negative to particular negative. 
But really there are only three: for the particular negative is only verbally opposed to the 
particular negative. Of the genuine opposites I call those which are universal contraries, 
e.g. “every science is good”, “no science is good”; the others I call contradictories.’ 
(Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 63b21–30)” (Béziau 2003; italics added.)
4 “I think that neither subalternation nor superalternation can be considered as relations 
of opposition. For example P is subaltern of P ∧ Q, and it does not really make sense 
to consider them as opposed.” (Béziau 2003, 224)
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Conversely, Sion (1996) increases the set of oppositions by including two 
further elements: implicance, and unconnectedness5. But he can do so only 
by modifying the content of the questions Q. Sion’s view of oppositions pro-
ceeds from a set of Q = 4 alternative questions about whether the relata are 
possibly T or F, rather than compossibly. We thus have a new set of basic 
questions-answers (where Q = 4 and P = 2): Q1: “v(α) = T, v(β) = T?”, Q2: 
“v(α) = T, v(β) = F?”, Q3: “v(α) = F, v(β) = T?”, and Q4: “v(α) = F, v(β) = F?”, 
where to the additional oppositions of implicance and unconnectedness cor-
respond the 4-tuples of answers 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 and 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉.
But to do so is actually to characterize the meaning of a classical propo-
sitional connective. Should any such connective be considered as a proper 
opposition? It is well-known that each logical opposition corresponds to 
exactly one logical connective among the mn = 24 = 16 ordered answers 
〈P1,P2,P3,P4〉. Thus CT amounts to incompatibility (↑(α, β) = 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉), CD 
to exclusive disjunction (∨ (α, β) = 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉), SCT to inclusive disjunction 
(∨ (α, β) = 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉), and SB to conditional (→ (α, β) = 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉). However, 
a geometrical representation of Sion’s alleged oppositions does not result 
in the Apuleian square but a slightly different set of geometrical objects, 
namely: a logical quatern, depicted syntactically with a theory of quater-
nality by Gottschalk (1953) and semantically with a theory of reversibility 
(or INRC group) by Piaget (1949).
Sion’s alleged oppositions of implicance and unconnectedness refer 
to the connectives of biconditional (↔ (α, β) = 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉) and tautology 
(T(α, β) = 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉), respectively; but he stops the process there, instead 
of exhausting the combinatorial list of his answers. Thus there is a gap 
 We’ll see later that Moretti (2009) presents a constructive argument against Béziau’s 
present point: the geometry of oppositions cannot be expanded without using 
subalternation in its representations. 
5 “By the ‘opposition’ of two propositions, is meant: the exact logical relation existing 
between them – whether the truth or falsehood of either affects, or not, the truth or 
falsehood of the other. In this context, note, the expression “opposition” is a technical 
term not necessarily connoting conflict. We commonly say of two statements that they 
are “opposite”, in the sense of incompatible. But there, the meaning is wider; it refers 
to any mental confrontation, any logical face-off, between distinguishable propositions. 
In this sense, even forms which imply each other may be viewed as ‘opposed’ by virtue 
of their contradistinction, though to a much lesser degree than contradictories. Thus, 
the various relations of opposition make up a continuum.” (Sion 1996, Ch.6, 1; italics 
added.)
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between the compossible truth-values of our own characterization of Op 
and the possible truth-values of Sion’s characterization.
Given that Sion’s view of opposition is not only unjustifiably incomplete 
but also gives rise to a geometrical object that is different from Aristotle’s 
square, we argue that the meaning of Op eventually relies on a combination 
of compossible truth-values. Roughly speaking, our own characterization 
in QAS constitutes a trade-off between two views of opposition: intensive 
(according to its meaning by Q), and extensive opposition (according to its 
extensions by P). As a minimal precondition, Q must be about the compos-
sibility of truth-values in order to follow the traditional theory of opposi-
tion. Such a precondition can make room for a generalization of the initial 
square by changing the parameters Q and P.
1.2 Generalization of Oppositions: Syntactic and Semantic Views
1.2.1 Syntactic Generalization
A syntactic generalization of the theory of opposition relies upon a struc-
tural extension of the relata in Op(Φ, Ψ), without any semantic reference to 
truth-values. As pointed out in the Figure 2, dual constants can be applied 
to propositions to give rise to a range of syntactic transformations.
Figure 2: The Logical Quatern
fB opC f_B
opDopN
opCiB i_B
opD
♣/♠: dual constants (♣α ⇔ ∼♠∼α) opC: contraduality
α/∼α: affirmative sentences/negative sentences opN: negation
 opD: duality
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Blanché (1953) noted this structural point, arguing that Aristotle’s theory 
of opposition still prevails beyond the sole case of quantified propositions 
(see Figure 1) and includes modal oppositions. Furthermore, the formu-
las Φ and Ψ serve as structured formulas Φ = ♣α and Ψ = ♠α, where the 
modal functions {♣,♠} can be variously interpreted: as null modality {∅}, 
quantifiers {∀ / ∃}, alethic modalities of necessity and possibility {/ }, 
deontic modalities of obligation and permission {op / P}; and so on6. An 
additional, purely syntactic definition of opposites op (where op ≠ Op) can 
thus be given as a set of construction rules for quaterns, where opX means 
“operates as a X”.
Definition 3. A logical opposite op is a 1-ary function on one formula Φ, 
where op is an operation from Φ to Ψ. To the two initial questions Q1: “Is 
the dual constant interchanged?” and Q2: “Is the sentence interchanged?”, 
each sort of opposition opX is a 1-ary operation that yields a 2-tuple of 
yes-no answers 〈P1,P2〉.
Definition 3.1. Duality (X = D) yields an affirmative P1 and a negative P2.
opN = 〈1, 1〉
Definition 3.2. Negation (X = N) yields an affirmative P1 and an affirma-
tive P2.
opD = 〈1, 0〉
Definition 3.3. Contraduality (X = C) yields a negative P1 and an affirma-
tive P2.
opC = 〈0, 1〉
Definition 3.4. Identity (X = I) yields a negative P1 and a negative P2.
opI = 〈0, 0〉
6 Φ and Ψ stand for 1-ary functions in (Blanché 1953, von Wright 1951) (where ♣ =  
and ♠ = ); but they can also stand for 2-ary functions, as in (Piaget (1949), Gottschalk 
(1953)) (where ♣ =  ∧  and ♠ = ∨).
 Unlike von Wright (1951), who strictly referred to ‘modalities’ as the modes in 
which a sentence is said to be true or false (necessarily, obligatorily, and so on) and 
distinguished them from the truth-operators (truth and falsity), we use “modalities” to 
refer only to a 1-ary sentential function throughout the present paper.
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Since Ψ results from Φ by applying one of the four preceding operations to 
Φ to get op(Φ) = Ψ, any opposition relation Op(Φ, Ψ) amounts to the oppo-
sition of Φ and one of its opposites op(Φ).
Definition 4. For any opposition relation Op(Φ, Ψ) and any oppositional oper-
ation opX on Φ (where X∈{N, D,C, I}), we have: Op(Φ, Ψ) = Op(Φ, opX(Φ)).
A famous expansion of the Apuleian square is the hexagon of alethic modal-
ities in (Blanché 1953, Sesmat 1951) where ♣ = . The difference between 
logical squares and hexagons does not reside in their relation Op, which is 
the same for the two; but rather in their relata: they are related by the same 
sorts of opposition. Thus Blanché’s hexagon results from the union of two 
triangles of contrariety and subcontrariety by their subaltern opposites.
Figure 3: The Hexagon of Modal (Alethic) Oppositions
A
B
E
_B
I
__B
O
_B
Y
_B__B
B_B
U
Y amounts to the non-basic modality of contingency (two-sided possibility), 
and its contradictory U is introduced in order to respect the central symme-
try for any paired opposites in the geometrical representation. The above 
transition from 4 to 6 vertices has been generalized by Moretti (2009) with 
his theory of n-opposition (NOT): a logical square is a bi-segment result-
ing from the subalternate connection of 2 segments or “simplexes” (viz. 
contrariety and subcontrariety); a logical hexagon amounts to a bi-triangle 
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resulting from the subalternate connection of 2 triangles; and so on, where 
each expanded logical polygon goes from one to an indefinite number of 
simplexes.
Aristotle’s square is thus only one geometrical opposition within a series 
of increasing cases, and the syntactic structure of opposed terms accounts 
for the complexity of logical polygons in NOT.
1.2.2 A Syntactic Key Notion for Oppositions: Negation
A distinction has just been made between an opposition Op and an oppo-
site op: opposition is a relation, whereas opposites are relata. The previous 
figures have shown that Aristotle’s square was a geometrical representation 
of opposition to be characterized by semantic questions about truth-values, 
while Gottschalk’s and Piaget’s quatern was a geometrical representation 
of opposites encoded by syntactic questions about structured formulas.
An intermediary position between semantic oppositions and syntac-
tic opposites would be a syntax of oppositions, all the more that a central 
topic for QAS is the syntactic concept of negation. In contradistinction to 
Moretti’s semantic approach, opposition has been thought in Béziau (2006) 
as a theory about classical and non-classical negations in the controversy 
against Slater’s objection to paraconsistent negation (see Slater (1995)). For 
this very reason, oppositions can be viewed as a relation between any for-
mula and one of its negated counterparts.
Definition 5. A logical opposite is a set of answers to questions about negat-
ing the components of an initial formula ♣α.
To the Q = 2 following questions Q1: “Is ♣ negated?” and Q2: “Is α 
negated?”, oppositions reply by an ordered set of P = 2 yes-no answers 
(where the 2-tuple 〈0, 0〉 is the trivial case of self-identity).
Definition 5.1. A subaltern opposite (opD) yields an affirmative P1 and an 
affirmative P2.
opD(♣α) = (∼♣∼α) = 〈1, 1〉
Definition 5.2. A contradictory opposite (opN) yields an affirmative P1 and 
a negative P2.
opN(♣α) = (∼♣α) = 〈1, 0〉
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Definition 5.3. A (sub-)contrary term (opC) yields a negative P1 and an 
affirmative P2.
opC(♣α) = (♣∼α) = 〈0, 1〉
Figure 4: The Logical Square
_f_B
 1,1¯
_fB
 1,0¯
 0,0¯
fB
 0,1¯
f_B
The advantage of such questioning is that it characterizes quaterns with-
out any reference to duals, and defines ♠α syntactically as ∼♣∼α. It also 
explains why subalternation is seen as a contradictory of contraries, given 
that the subaltern ∼♣∼α results from the successive application of opC 
and opN to the initial formula. Finally, it provides a relevant explanation for 
why subalternation is not a proper opposition: if any opposition includes an 
opposite-forming operator that proceeds by negating one or several compo-
nents in a formula, then subalternation amounts to a double negation and, 
thus, yields an affirmation from a classical perspective.
The disadvantage is, again, that a subcontrary opposite cannot be gath-
ered from any unnegated formula: the basic ♣α has no subcontrary oppo-
site, but only a contrary one ♣∼α. Likewise, subcontrariety cannot be gath-
ered by reading its expression ‘contradictory of contraries’ as a function 
of function: to say that SCT is the relation Op(♣α,(opN(opC(♣α)) is not a 
correct translation, because if ♣α = 〈0, 0〉 then opN(opC(♣α)) = opN(♣∼α) 
= (∼♣∼α) = opD(♣α). Hence Op(♣α, opD(♣α) = SB, and not SCT. Moreo-
ver, this syntactic characterization cannot be successfully applied to struc-
turally more complex formulas Φ such as non-basic modal sentences: the 
Y- and U-vertices of a logical hexagon cannot be specified by means of 
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Q1 and Q2 above, which means that a semantic characterization eventually 
prevails for a complete account of oppositions.
1.2.3 Semantic Generalization
Another way to generalize the geometry of oppositions is to turn what 
Moretti (2009) calls “logical bi-simplexes” into logical p-simplexes, includ-
ing p > 2: a syntactic generalization has to do with the structure of opposed 
formulas, whereas a semantic generalization concerns the number of their 
compossible truth-values. It is clear that Aristotle’s theory of opposition is 
entirely based on the PBV. But there is no reason not to introduce p > 2 
truth-values in a QAS abstract characterization, thereby turning the classi-
cal bi-simplexes into non-classical p-simplexes. By doing so, NOT sheds a 
new light on the controversial meaning of negational principles such as the 
excluded middle (PEM) or the non-contradiction (PNC).
The device should sound appealing for any champion of many-valued 
logics, especially in the variety of philosophical logics where “standing 
propositions” are superseded by mere “variable sentences”. Furthermore, 
Aristotle himself seemed to contest the universal applicability of PBV as 
regards the case of future contingents7. Despite this controversy about biva-
lence, no attempt was made to expand the theory of opposition to embrace 
p > 2 truth-values before Moretti (2009), who overcomes Slater’s objection 
to paraconsistent negation in the light of a non-classical reading of PNC8.
From our abstract perspective of QAS, a semantic generalization of 
oppositions entails a modification in the content of Q or P: either the ques-
tions are to be asked about the compossibility of alternative truth-values 
beyond truth and falsity, so that n > 2; or the answers may be extended 
beyond “yes” and “no”, so that m > 2. Let us take Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued 
logic of indeterminacy Ł3 as an example, where v(α) = ½ means that α is 
7 See Aristotle (a), Chapter 9. The customary interpretation is that Aristotle renounced to 
the universal application of PBV while maintaining PEM. Some other commentaries 
blamed this view for confusing on sentence and a proposition, however. Such 
differences will be returned to in the next section about illocutionary modalities.
8 The question is whether PNC is about contradiction in particular, or negation in 
general. It is argued in Béziau (2006) that a negation needn’t be a contradictory-forming 
operator: not every negation opX verifies Op(Φ, opX(Φ)) = CD. But since PNC is about 
CD, it is hardly relevant to say that Op(Φ, opR(Φ)) = SCT when the point is opN and not 
opC. Consequently, a further challenge would be to find a non-classical version of opN 
for which Op(Φ, opN(Φ)) = CD is verified while departing from PNC.
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indeterminate. Indeterminacy can be interpreted in two different ways in 
QAS. Either it is added as a further truth-value besides truth and falsity, in 
which case a new question Q3: “Possibly v(α) = v(β) = ½?” is introduced; 
or it is interpreted as an indefinite answer beyond affirmation (“yes”) and 
denial (“no”), so that a new answer P3: “maybe” is introduced. The result-
ing set of questions-answers will amount to either mn = 23 = 8 oppositions, 
or mn = 32 = 9 oppositions.
These non-classical oppositions give rise to three problems: how does 
one account for the difference in the number of oppositions when m = 3 
or n = 3, since the results in the two cases are supposed to have the same 
meaning? How should one interpret the non-classical oppositions? Isn’t it 
possible to reduce the non-classical oppositions to classical ones? It is out 
of the scope of the presented paper to examine these questions.
2. Application of the Theory of Opposition
After describing the abstract properties of opposition, we now apply the 
logical analysis presented to settle several problems from philosophical 
logic. Among these are the traditional problem of existential import, and 
the intermediary case of epistemic oppositions.
It is argued in the sequel that epistemic modalities help to settle the 
problem of existential import by making a distinction between two senses 
of the underlying concept of truth, namely: an ontological sense of “being 
true”, and an epistemological sense of “being held to be true”. Opting for 
the latter allows the construction of the so-called “illocutionary modalities”, 
a linguistic trade-off between epistemic modalities and truth-claims. The 
results of Moretti (2009) will be used as a way to represent our solution to 
existential import in an alternative geometry of oppositions.
2.1 The Core Problem of Opposition: Existential Import
It has been generally claimed that Aristotle’s theory of opposition was 
flawed unless one implicitly assumed the non-emptiness of its component 
terms. The reason for this claim is that Aristotle did not address the specific 
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problem of the alleged existential import for negative propositions E-O. Our 
answer to the initial question of knowing whether negative propositions are 
existentially committed is clearly no. But before developing our own diag-
nosis, let us first consider the issue.
Hypothesis 1. Universal affirmatives have existential import.
Let A be: “Every griffin is an animal”, and let v be an interpretation func-
tion for every proposition in AEIO. Granted there are no griffins at all, it 
is naturally assumed that v(A) = F: nothing can be truly predicated about 
whatever does not exist, which implies that v(A) ≠ T; now by PBV, v(A) ≠ T 
entails v(A) = F.
O is the contradictory of A, hence v(O) = T. A is a universal affirma-
tive, hence O is a particular negative stating that there is at least one grif-
fin that is not an animal. Hence there is at least one griffin and there are 
no griffins at all (by assumption), which is self-contradictory. Such a con-
sequence is absurd, by PNC and so is its premise, which in turn must be 
refuted: v(A) ≠ F, so v(A) = T.
The initial assumption that griffins don’t exist is compatible with 
v(A) = T, provided that universal propositions don’t presuppose the exist-
ence of their subject terms. Modern logic meets this proviso, by encod-
ing a universal proposition in the form of a conditional whose antecedent 
needn’t be true. If so, then A means: “If x is a griffin, then x is an animal”. 
Given that the universal affirmative is the negation of the corresponding 
particular negative: “Every A is B” = “Not-(Some A is not B)”, v(A) = T iff 
there is no griffin which is not an animal. Now there is no griffin at all. 
Hence v(A) = T.
Hypothesis 2. Universal affirmatives don’t have existential import.
That v(A) = T entails that v(E) = F. If v(E) = F, then its contradictory is T, 
i.e. v(I) = T. I is a particular affirmative, thus meaning that there is at least 
one griffin that is an animal. Now the initial assumption claims that there 
are no griffins, whatever the interpretation of the universal may be (whether 
existential or not). Hence v(I) = F and v(I) = T. This is self-contradictory, 
by PNC. Hence the initial assumption must be rejected again.
Conclusion.
Both hypotheses v(A) = T and v(A) = F result in an inconsistent theory of 
oppositions when applied to propositions with empty terms.
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In the light of the foregoing reductio ad absurdum, two general reactions 
are conceivable.
In order to avoid inconsistency in the theory of opposition, one either 
assumes the non-emptiness of subject terms as an ad hoc hypothesis. This 
was Russell’s stance on the semantic paradox, when he proposed his rami-
fied type theory as a way out.
Or one sustains that propositions with empty terms (without referent) 
are as much meaningful as any other, thus opening the way for improving 
Aristotle’s theory of opposition without begging the point. We will endorse 
this second attitude in the sequel.
There is a rich literature on existential import. Horn (1989, p. 24) lists 
four different positions on the subject as follows:
There are, as it happens, at least four distinct ways of answering such 
questions:
(i) Existential import is determined by the quality of the proposition; 
affirmative (A and I) propositions entail existence, while negative 
ones (E and O) do not.
(ii) Existential import is determined by the quantity of the proposition: 
universals (A and E) have no existential import, while particulars 
(I and O) do.
(iii) Existential import corresponds to a presupposition associated with 
A, E, I and O propositions.
(iv) The question of existential import is entirely absent from the Square 
of Opposition.
The present paper rejects (ii) and (iv) while endorsing (i) and (iii): E and O 
entail (don’t entail) existence whenever the latter is presupposed (is not pre-
supposed), and such a presupposition depends upon the speaker’s intention. 
The problem is not of a syntactic order but has to do with the ambiguous 
interpretation of O, in the sense that not every contradictory of a univer-
sal affirmative amounts to a negative particular. The difficulty thus lies in 
the natural translation of the O-vertex, which is customarily rendered as 
a particular negative in the Apuleian square. Our approach squares with 
Abelard’s position, as described by (Horn 1989, p. 26):
For Aristotle, Not every man is white was indeed taken to be the canonical contradic-
tory of Every man is white (De Int., 24b6), but there is no suggestion that it is not con-
sidered to be equivalent to Some man is not white; for Apuleius and Boethius, these 
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two forms were explicitly taken to be notational variants. Abelard’s results, despite 
the consistency of his argumentation, were apparently too counterintuitive to be taken 
seriously; later medieval (and modern) logicians almost without exception rejected this 
distinction between non omnis and quidam non9.
Such a distinction will be taken seriously and made intuitive in the sequel, 
on the basis of a twofold reading of Aristotle’s assertoric propositions: an 
ontological reading, which concerns the truth and falsity of propositions; 
an epistemological reading, which concerns the attitude of speakers toward 
such propositions. The source of the problem seems to reside in a deep con-
fusion between the “affirmation” and “negation” of assertoric oppositions; 
the suggested way out is a more fine-grained analysis of negation, espe-
cially the O-vertex of the initial logical square.
2.2 Epistemic Modalities
An epistemological reading of assertoric oppositions refers to epistemic 
modalities, where a propositional attitude is attached to a sentential content. 
The most familiar epistemic concepts are knowledge and belief, symbol-
ized by two modal operators K and B. Now three main difficulties arise if 
we want to construct a polygon of epistemic oppositions; these concern the 
logical relations between knowledge and belief, knowledge and truth, and 
the assumption of mere consideration.
2.2.1 Knowledge and Belief
Firstly, knowledge and belief don’t seem to be included in the same polygon 
of opposition. A tentative theory of epistemic oppositions was proposed by 
Engel (2007), with the square of Figure 5.
Although the affirmative subalternation AI matches with the “entail-
ment thesis”: Kα ⇒ Bα, it is easily seen that it leads to some counterintuitive 
results: IE states that whatever is ignored is not believed (and conversely), 
while EO claims that no ignored proposition can be believed. Furthermore, 
ignorance is currently viewed as the negation of knowledge (∼K) and should 
thus be opposed to knowledge contradictorily rather than contrarily. As for 
9 About Apuleius’ conflation of non omnis and quidam non, see also Monteil (2003) 
and Parsons (2006). Expansion from the Apuleian square to a new logical polygon, as 
proposed in the sequel, is actually aimed at making Abelard’s results more intuitive.
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disbelief, the ambiguous meaning between B∼α and ∼Bα cannot be made 
sufficiently clear in a polygon of opposition with only 4 vertices. The cru-
cial point is that K and B are equally strong modalities paralleling necessity 
♣ = , so that both of them should be located at one and the same vertex 
A. There are two alternative ways to settle the problem.
A first move is to turn Engel’s logical square into a logical hexagon of 
(strictly) epistemic and doxastic modalities, where K and B occur in two 
separate polygons and are contrary to a common epistemic counterpart of 
contingency, namely: doubt (the Y-vertice). The following figure depicts 
similar oppositions for ♣ = K or B, while recalling the apparent impossi-
bility to combine these into one and the same polygon (Figure 6).
Figure 5: A Square for Epistemic Oppositions
A
Knowledge
E
Ignorance
Belief
I
Disbelief
O
Figure 6: A Hexagon for Epistemic Oppositions
A
fB
E
f_B
I
_f_B
O
_fB
Y
_f_B_fB
fBf_B
U
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2.2.2 Knowledge and Truth
A second move is to merge knowledge and belief into one and the same 
modality, in order to produce a common modality of strong belief or sub-
jective certainty.
Although some logics of knowledge as strong belief already occurred in 
the literature of epistemic logic, the mainstream view of epistemic modali-
ties follows Plato’s definition of knowledge as justified true belief (Theaete-
tus, 200d-e). The concept of truth makes the substantial difference between 
belief as a psychological attitude and knowledge as an objective state: such 
an “ontological” difference means that every proper knowledge is a belief 
that is made true by a state of affairs. In accordance with this philosophical 
tradition, the logical framework of Kripke’s relational semantics gave rise to 
a series of modal systems with specific accessibility relations between “pos-
sible worlds”; the conspicuous domination of Kripke structures thus requires 
an examination of several modal systems for characterizing K and B.
Epistemic modalities are currently characterized as KT4(5) or KD45 
modalities, depending on whether the modality at hand is knowledge or 
belief. This means that the following axiom schemata variously hold for 
♣ = K or B: (K): (♣α ∧ (α ⇒ β)) ⇒ ♣β, (T) ♣α ⇒ α, (D) ♣α ⇒ ∼♣∼α, 
(4) ♣α ⇒ ♣♣α, (5) ∼♣α ⇒ ♣∼♣α. The reduction laws of modalities for 
the iterative systems S4 and S5 help to introduce corresponding polygons 
of opposition, as illustrated by Moretti (2009).
But it can also be noted that such a characterization of epistemic modal-
ities can be made intuitive by an alternative, illocutionary interpretation 
of epistemic modalities where “truth” is only synonymous with “truth-
claim”10. So is the case with the Moore’s Paradox, according to which it is 
absurd but not inconsistent to say “It rains, but I don’t believe it” (α ∧ ∼Bα). 
The prominent diagnosis argues that its statement departs from the sincer-
ity condition for every uttered statement: any speaker is supposed to believe 
what it states. In other words, a correct formalization of the Moorean state-
ment is not (α ∧ ∼Bα) but its iterated version B(α ∧ ∼Bα). The distribu-
tivity of epistemic operators entails that the Moorean sentence amounts 
to a statement of the logical form (Bα ∧ B∼Bα), thus violating the axiom 
schema (4) and making it explicitly inconsistent. More generally, Fitch 
(1963) has shown that ♣(α ∧ ∼♣α) is inconsistent (logically false) for any 
10 See Schang (2007) for a detailed account of epistemic paradoxes and the motivation 
of their illocutionary treatment.
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value concept ♣, whether it be instantiated by belief, knowledge, or even 
truth. The same inconsistency occurs in the subsequent Fitch’s Paradox of 
Knowability, where any epistemic modality ♣ turns its sentential content 
α into the content of a statement ♣α with illocutionary clauses.
In short, an illocutionary reading of epistemic modalities consists in 
merging knowledge and belief into one and the same attitude of truth-
claim and replacing the criterion of justification for K by its degree of force: 
knowledge is then synonymous with certainty, or strong truth-claim, in such 
a logic of statements where no realistically-minded difference is maintained 
any longer between the concepts of knowledge and truth.
Whether the reader favours a realist or anti-realist stance about knowl-
edge, the point is that such a reduction of truth (of a sentential content) to 
truth-claim (of its corresponding statement) will be endorsed in the next 
section about existential import; this will be done after considering another 
difficulty with epistemic oppositions and their formulation.
2.2.3 Knowledge and Mere Consideration
The statement of doubt (in symbols: D) was characterized above as an epis-
temic counterpart of contingency. That is, whoever has doubts about α also 
disbelieves both α and ∼α: Dα = df ∼Bα ∧ ∼B∼α, where disbelief is ren-
dered as the negation of belief.
But there is a difference between non-belief, as a mere absence of belief, 
and disbelief. As noted in Englebretsen (1969) and Hart (1980), not every 
sentential content α can be doubted by anyone. It is so, because disbelief 
assumes a self-conscious activity by a subject who considers, i.e. thinks 
about the sentential content. Thus Socrates couldn’t have been said to doubt 
(or to have doubts about) Obama’s victory during the US elections 2008, 
because he wouldn’t have been able to think about such a referent. This 
results in a more complex picture of epistemic oppositions, where every 
such attitude towards a sentential content α requires its consideration as a 
minimal precondition.
In order to construct a modal logic of doubt, Hart (1980) claims in that 
the latter is to be defined as a believed non-belief, so that we obtain the 
compound characterization Dα = df B(∼Bα ∧ ∼B∼α). A S5-modal logic 
of belief would help to include the non-basic modality of doubt by reduc-
ing B∼B to ∼B; but such a characterization would conflate whatever is not 
believed self-consciously or not. In a nutshell, non-beliefs are to be opposed 
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to disbeliefs; the problem is thus to find the right vertex in the right poly-
gon of epistemic oppositions supplemented with doubt.
For this purpose, Englebretsen (1969) takes the basic notion of consid-
eration into account by adding a new scope of negation to the epistemic 
oppositions. It is to be noticed that Englebretsen proceeds by returning to 
the sources of Aristotle’s tradition or “term logic”, where negation could 
be applied either to the copula or to the predicate term.
Figure 7: The Four in Term Logic
(Affirmation) S is P
 0,0¯
S is not-P (Contraffirmation)
 0,1¯
 1,1¯
(Contradenial) S is not not-P
 1,0¯
S is not P (Denial)
By analogy with the abstract structure of quaterns (see Figure 2), we fall 
here again on a compound structure ♣α where ♣ = S and α = P. A relevant 
difference should be made between a predicate negation “not” and a predi-
cate term negation “not-”: the former is attached to the whole predication 
“S is P” and proceeds like sentential negation; the latter uses a hyphen that 
restricts the scope of negation to the predicate term P. The first results in 
contraffirmation (♣∼α) and the second in mere denial (∼♣α). No wonder 
the opposites are as numerous in term logic (Figure 6) as in quantified prop-
ositions (Figure 1): their structured formulas result from the same question-
answer game with mn = 22 = 4, Q1: “Is ♣ negated?”, and Q2: “Is α negated?”.
In addition to the foregoing more fine-grained scope of negation, 
the introduction of the component of consideration turns the structure 
of epistemic modalities from Φ = ♣α into the more complex structure 
@(Φ) = @♣α, where @ is a consideration-operator that applies to the 
whole epistemic statement ♣α and means that α is considered. Accord-
ingly, Englebretsen’s conflation of term and epistemic logic results in a 
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multi-modal logic with n = PQ = 23 = 8 available opposites, given Q1 = “Is @ 
negated?”, Q2 = “Is ♣ negated?”, and Q3 = “Is α negated?”. The 8 subse-
quent answers are described in Englebretsen (1969) by a group of 5 differ-
ent squares, where ♣ = K but could also stand for B in our merged perspec-
tive of epistemic modalities.
The NOT framework should shed theoretical light on the construc-
tion of a complete polygon including all of these epistemic oppositions to 
replace Englebretsen’s five separate squares. Pending such a construction 
Figure 8: Epistemic Multi-Modal Oppositions
 0,0,0¯
@fB
 0,0,1¯
@f_B
_@f_B
 1,0,1¯
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 1,0,0¯
 0,0,0¯
@fB
 0,1,0¯
@_fB
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for multi-modalities, the following semantics for assertoric oppositions sug-
gests an alternative reading of epistemic mono-modalities where considera-
tion is vacuously included.
2.3 Illocutionary Modalities
2.3.1 Assertoric Statements
The illocutionary import of epistemic attitudes stems from Austin’s seminal 
distinction between a locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary feature 
of speech-acts (symbols: Fα): the locutionary aspect refers to the sentential 
content α and its semantic properties; the illocutionary aspect refers to the 
intended aim of its utterance by a speaker; the perlocutionary aspect refers 
to its expected effect upon the hearer.
A formal pragmatics has been proposed accordingly by Searle & Vander-
veken (1985), where every speech-act Fα essentially includes an “illocu-
tionary force” F with six main components among five classes of speech 
acts. Assertive acts are one case in point: a statement such as “Obama won 
the US elections 2008” is an assertion, where the speaker intends to tell 
the truth and succeeds in doing so only if its sentential content α describes 
how things really are.
Without going into further details on the framework of illocutionary 
logic, we need two of its main components in what follows, namely: the 
sincerity condition of an assertive act and its degree of strength. Indeed, 
the so-called “direction of fit” between a sentential content and the state 
of affairs expressed by it assumes a correspondence theory of truth that 
couldn’t be endorsed from an antirealist perspective, so that assertive acts 
occur hereafter as truth-claims that don’t really depart from belief. Moreo-
ver, the logical status of denial is not made clear by Searle & Vanderveken: 
it is not clearly argued whether denial belongs to the specific class of asser-
tive acts or serves as a general negation for any illocutionary force. While 
such an illocutionary negation is compared with intuitionistic negation11, 
it will be argued below that the latter is just a subcase of denial.
11 “Illocutionary negation is like intuitionistic negation from this perspective since, 
in intuitionistic logic, it is equally invalid that α ∨ ∼α and ∼∼α → α.” (Searle & 
Vanderveken, p. 154; also quoted in Vernant (2003, footnote 22 p. 5).
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2.3.2 An Assertoric Logic of Affirmation and Denial
In order to give a more fine-grained analysis of denial (illocutionary nega-
tion), the technical use of relational semantics by Vanderveken’s formal 
pragmatics is replaced here by an algebraic semantics for affirmation and 
denial. Here is the characterization of assertive or assertoric statements 
F = {A, R}, where each speech-act ♣ = F is the expression of a correspond-
ing epistemic attitude.
Definition 6. An assertoric statement Sα (with F = S) is a value-claim or 
logical judgment about the truth-value of a sentence α, where a truth-value 
{T, F} is predicated of the sentential content.
To the Q = 2 initial questions about a sentential content α: “Do you hold 
v(α) = T?” and “Do you hold v(α) = F?”, assertoric modalities reply by an 
ordered set of P = 2 yes-no answers.
Definition 6.1. An affirmation (or acceptance) (A) yields an affirmative 
P1, irrespective of P2.
(α) = 〈1,−〉
The epistemic counterpart of affirmation is belief: Bα.
There are two subspecies of acceptance.
Definition 6.1.1. A conjecture (A−) yields an affirmative P1 and a affirma-
tive P2.
(α) = 〈1, 1〉
The epistemic counterpart of conjecture is weak belief: Bα ∧ B∼α.
Definition 6.1.2. An assertion (A+) yields an affirmative P1 and a nega-
tive P2.
(α) = 〈1, 0〉
The epistemic counterpart of assertion is strong belief: Bα ∧ ∼B∼α.
Definition 6.2. A denial (or rejection) (R) yields a negative P1, irrespec-
tive of P2.
(α) = 〈0,−〉
The epistemic counterpart of denial is disbelief: ∼Bα.
There are two subspecies of rejection.
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Definition 6.2.1. A neg-assertion (R−) yields an affirmative P1 and a neg-
ative P2.
(α) = 〈0, 1〉
The epistemic counterpart of neg-assertion is strong disbelief: ∼Bα ∧ B∼α.
Definition 6.2.2. A doubt (R+) yields an affirmative P1 and a negative P2.
(α) = 〈0, 0〉
The epistemic counterpart of doubt is weak disbelief: ∼Bα ∧ ∼B∼α.
A formal semantics for assertoric modalities can be characterized as fol-
lows, where these are taken to be 1-ary statement-forming operators upon 
sentences (in the vein of Bochvar’s external operators or von Wright’s 
truth logics). In addition to truth-values for sentences, truth-claim values 
are introduced for statements such that v(A+α) = 1 iff v(α) = 〈1, 0〉 and 
v(A+α) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 7. A statement ♣α is right (1) or wrong (0) if it expresses the 
speaker’s epistemic attitude about α.
Definition 7.1. v(A−α) = 1 iff v(α) = 〈1, 1〉 , and v(A−α) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.2. v(A+α) = 1 iff v(α) = 〈1, 0〉 , and v(A+α) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.3. v(R−α) = 1 iff v(α) = 〈0, 1〉 , and v(R−α) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.4. v(A+α) = 1 iff v(α) = 〈0, 0〉 , and v(A+α) = 0 otherwise.
Illocutionary oppositions are reformulated correspondingly in terms of 
compossible truth-claim values rather than truth-values.
Definition 8. An opposition is a set of answers to questions about com-
possible truth-claims for the statement ♣α and its opposite opX(♣α) (where 
♣∈{A, R} and X∈{I, N,C, D}).
To the Q = 2 following questions Q1: “Possibly v(♣α) = v(op(♣α)) = F?” 
and Q2: “Possibly v(♣α) = v(op(♣α)) = T?”, oppositions reply by an ordered 
2-tuple of answers: Op(♣α, op(♣α)) = 〈P1,P2〉.
The same ordered 2-tuples hold here as in Definition 2, with 
Op = {SB, CT, SCT, CD}.
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It is easily seen that such a logic of statements departs from classical logic, 
in the light of the answers v(α) = 〈1, 1〉 and v(α) = 〈0, 0〉: the truth of a sen-
tence classically entails the falsehood of its negation, but not here. This is 
due to the formulation of Q, in our corresponding question-answer seman-
tics: the point about statements is not whether their sentential content is true 
or false, but whether it is held to be so.
Each of the four answers refers to a special assertoric force, whose clas-
sification depends both upon its quality (affirmative or negative) and its 
degree of force (X+ or X−).
On the one hand, it is to be noted that “affirmation” and “negation” 
refer here to P (and not α): an affirmative answer may be given about 
whether a negative sentence is true, (e.g., v(∼α) = 〈1,−〉), and conversely 
(e.g., v(α) = 〈0,−〉). Let us recall that locutionary affirmation and nega-
tion concern the quality of a sentential content α, whereas illocutionary 
affirmation or “yes”-answer (A = {A+, A−}) and negation or “no”-answer 
(R = {R+, R−}) concern the quality of an answer P12.
On the other hand, assertion shouldn’t be assimilated to affirmation in 
our non-classical semantics: it is the strongest assertoric force, because it 
is a one-sided affirmation that is closer to truth-claim than any of its coun-
terparts in {A, R}. In other words, the degree of force of an assertoric state-
ment is determined by a linear ordering relation > between definite and 
indefinite answers P: 〈1, 0〉 > 〈1, 1〉 > 〈0, 0〉 > 〈0, 1〉. The previous modality 
of consideration @ is vacuously assumed in every aforementioned speech 
act, in the sense that any answer P is self-consciously given by the speaker.
As regards the existential import, an important point about assertoric 
statements is that only two of them are mentioned as usual speech acts: 
assertion A+ and denial R, whose utterances are rendered by such ambigu-
ous statements as “S is P” and “S is not P” respectively. The reason is that 
assertoric statements ordinarily aim at telling the truth and nothing but the 
truth, whether it concerns affirmative sentences or their negation. Hence 
the unique judgment stroke A in Frege’s Begrisschrift, which means that the 
12 A way to argue that denial (illocutionary negation) is prior to sentential (locutionary) 
negation is that the former essentially occurs as a definiens of the latter. Firstly, no “∼” 
occurs in the formulation of Q and P but only the expressions of falsity (F) or denial 
(0). Secondly, locutionary negation cannot occur without a corresponding illocutionary 
negation, but the converse does not hold: not every “no”-answer to Q1 entails a “yes”-
answer to Q2, as witnessed by P = 〈0, 0〉. In other words, every negative statement 
proceeds from an illocutionary denial before being rendered by a locutionary negation.
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following judgeable content α is held to be true by the speaker and holds as 
an axiom or derived theorem. But while Frege (1952) equated the opposite 
act of denial with an assertion of the negative content: A∼α, denial may 
mean a mere rejection of α without any corresponding affirmation of ∼α. 
Now any mere refusal doesn’t stand for a particular speech act but a nega-
tive psychological attitude, and the indefinite statements of conjecture or 
doubt are just hinted by the tone of voice or qualifying clauses like “It seems 
that” (for conjecture) or “I don’t say that” (for doubt). Hence any utterance of 
α is naturally understood as the expression of 〈1, 0〉 or 〈0, 1〉, and the prob-
lem of existential import is symptomatic of such a narrow understanding 
of affirmative and negative statements.
2.3.3 Back to the Existential Import
Recalling Aristotle’s term logic, the modality of neg-assertion amounts to 
a contraffirmation and differs from denial. Thus Figure 6 can be partly 
reconstructed by means of assertoric modalities with the same structure 
♣α, where ♣ = A or R.
Figure 9: The Four in Assertoric Logic
A(B): S is P
 1,¯
A(_B): S is not-P
 ,1¯
 ,0¯
R(_B): S is not not-P
 0,¯
R(B): S is not P
It clearly appears that not every assertoric statement is represented in the 
above figure: A and R are expressed by means of corresponding affirma-
tive or negative statements, but nothing is said about their degree of force. 
This is so because Aristotle’s traditional logic was uniquely composed of 
categorical assertions, where PBV restricts the range of P to 〈1, 0〉 and 
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〈0, 1〉. Now the case of empty subject terms created a difficulty in Aristo-
tle’s semantics: as argued by Horn (1989), Aristotle generally accepted that 
v(∼α) = T whenever the subject term does not exist; this entails that any 
denial of such a sentential content was held to be true by Aristotle13. Thus 
v(α) = 〈0, 1〉 seems to be the right answer for any statement whose senten-
tial content includes an empty subject term.
But this is not the case, in the light of the relevant distinction between 
contraffirmation (neg-assertion) and denial: a sentence can be denied 
without its sentential negation being thereby affirmed, and an appropri-
ate translation for Aristotle’s attitude about empty terms should be rather 
v(α) = 〈0, 0〉. After all, Aristotle was said to accept the truth of denials 
such as “Not every griffin is an animal” while denying the truth of “Some 
griffin is not an animal”. This means that only negative predications were 
accepted by the Stagirite in such cases, but not negated predicate terms; and 
given that only the first case corresponds to an illocutionary negation in 
our logic of assertoric statements, it follows from this term distinction that 
what was accepted by Aristotle is not the truth of a negative sentence ∼α 
but the denying attitude of any speaker about α: R(α) is right, not A(∼α).
Does this illocutionary interpretation of negation give a consistent pic-
ture of the theory of opposition embracing the case of empty terms? On the 
one hand, the preceding figure shows that the logical square is insufficient 
for a geometrical representation of illocutionary oppositions; on the other 
hand, the syntactic generalization due to Moretti (2009) yields a group of 
polygonal oppositions for a logic of assertoric statements that takes account 
of their degree of strength (see Figure 10).
There are not CT = 2, as in Aristotle’s square, but CT = 4 sorts of con-
trary statements: any two assertoric modalities exclude from each other 
(e.g., whatever is asserted is not conjectured), and the previous definition 
of subcontraries as contradictories of contraries gives rise to an identical 
number for subcontrary terms.
We thus obtain a gathering of 3-dimensional bisimplexes, according to 
the terminology of Moretti. An exhaustive geometrical representation of 
these illocutionary oppositions is composed of two tetrahedra of contrariety 
13 In connection with footnote 13, (Horn 1989, p. 24) says that the “qualitative approach (i) 
has its roots in Aristotle (…) The existence of Socrates, as we have seen, is a necessary 
condition for the truth of any singular proposition concerning him (e.g., Socrates is 
ill), while his nonexistence is a sufficient condition for the truth of the corresponding 
(contradictory) negation (Socrates is not ill)”. 
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Figure 10: Two Tetrahedra of Simplexes and One Cube of Subalternation
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Figure 11: A Tetraicosahedron of Assertoric Oppositions
RBAB
(y _RB_AB)
ABRB
(y _RB_AB)
ABRB
(y _AB_RB)
ABRB
(y _AB_RB)
_AB
_RB
RB
ABAB
(y _RB_RB)
RBRB
(y _AB_AB)
AB
RB
AB
_AB
_RB
Questions and Answers about Oppositions 317
and subcontrariety (connected by contradictories) together with one cube of 
subalternation, where the four vertices of Aristotle’s square (see Figure 8) 
occur as partial cases (see Figure 11).
The difference between the neg-assertion A− and the denial R was thus 
rendered using Abelard’s medieval distinction between the two alternative 
expressions of O: “Not every S is P”, and “Some S is not P”. We stick here 
to the first interpretation of O as an illocutionary negation of A, without 
following Apuleius’ and Boethius’ translation as a particular negative: “S 
is not-P”. In other words, nothing is to be affirmed about non-existing enti-
ties like griffins: neither v(α) = T, nor v(α) = F (i.e. v(∼α) = T), so that the 
proper formalization of O is not A−(∼α) but R(α). To be more precise, the 
initial sentence α: “Every griffin is an animal” (or, equivalently: “Griffins 
are animals”) is as much denied as its locutionary negation:  “Some grif-
fin is not an animal”, in the sense that no affirmation (“ – is …”) could be 
rightly uttered about a non-existing entity. If so, then α and ∼α are equally 
denied and the corresponding statement is not neg-assertion but doubt: 
R+(α), or v(α) = 〈0, 0〉.
In the light of the preceding figure highlighting assertoric oppositions, 
Aristotle’s A- and O-vertices turn out to be contradictory to each other in a 
restrictive sense of negation: “Not every S is P” appears as the illocution-
ary negation of “Every S is P”, in accordance to the equivalence ∼A(α) 
⇔ R(α) (whatever is not affirmed is denied, and conversely). By contradis-
tinction, any affirmation about griffins will be contrary to a neg-assertion 
about them: both are incorrect, i.e. v(A+(α)) = v(A+(∼α)) = v(R−(α)) = 0. It 
amounts to saying that O doesn’t mean the illocutionary affirmation of a 
negative sentential content (viz. a particular negative) but rather the illocu-
tionary negation of an affirmative sentential content (viz. a universal affirm-
ative). In other words: while the Abelardian “Not every S is P” attaches 
the negation to the universal quantifier, its (Apuleian or Boethian) variant 
“Some S is not P” is misleading in the light of our modal structuration. For 
the contradictory of ♣α is not ♣∼α but ∼♣α, which appears clearly only 
if the illocutionary aspect of an utterance is made explicit by ♣.
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3. Conclusion: the Future of Logical Opposition
Logical opposition has been considered throughout this paper in its main 
properties and its various applications. It has mainly been argued that:
(1) A question-answer game QAS properly used supports a complete theory 
of opposition, beyond Aristotle’s initially quantified theory; a seman-
tic generalization helps to characterize oppositions as 2-ary relations 
between any propositions, while a syntactic generalization helps to 
define logical opposites as its relata.
(2) The theory of opposition can be made totally consistent and settle the 
case of existential import by adopting an illocutionary view of opposi-
tions that relates statements rather than mere sentences and distinguishes 
two senses of negation.
The theory of logical opposition may thus be completely overhauled, in 
the light of NOT and its formulation within the conceptual framework of 
QAS. Why not think about logic as a theory of opposition, rather than as 
a theory of consequence?
Is it because of the imprecise meaning of an opposition as compared to 
the precise characterization of logical consequence as truth-preservation? 
This paper has attempted to advance the perfectible theory of opposition 
by placing the emphasis on the concept of negation rather than on truth.
The incompleteness of Aristotle’s theory of opposition has left a crucial 
gap between traditional and modern logic.
Our solution to existential import is an attempt to show that the theory 
of opposition is beyond traditional logic but can adequately be dealt with 
in purely modern logic terms such as relations, negation, and truth-values.
Given the prominent role of logical consequence in modern logic, the 
author will present opposition Op (and its opposite-forming operator op) 
as a counterpart of abstract consequence Cn (and its associated conclusion-
forming operator) in a future work.
In a nutshell, opposition does not deserve to be considered as a mere 
tourist curiosity with old-fashioned properties. Given a proper facelift-
ing, logical opposition can clearly emerge as a thick-skinned concept. This 
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motivates our interest in NOT and QAS. The ageless concept of logical 
opposition needs to be clarified if the concern of logic is not to be just about 
consequence and truth but also about opposition and negation. The ultimate 
goal of our future works is to show that a theory of opposition comes to a 
logical theory of negation just as a theory of consequence comes to a logi-
cal theory of truth:
 Consequence  Opposition
  = 
 Truth  Negation
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